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THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF
REGULATORY COSTS
Frank Ackerman ∗
Will unbearable regulatory costs ruin the United States economy? This
specter haunts officials in Washington, just as fears of communism once
did. Once again, the prevailing rhetoric suggests that an implacable enemy
of free enterprise puts our prosperity at risk. Like anti-communism in its
heyday, anti-command-and-control-ism serves to narrow debate, promoting
the unregulated laissez-faire economy as the sole acceptable goal and
standard for public policy. Fears of the purported costs of regulation have
been used to justify a sweeping reorganization of regulatory practice, in
which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is empowered to, and
often enough does, reject regulations from other agencies on the basis of
intricate, conjectural economic calculations.
This article argues for a different perspective: what is remarkable about
regulatory costs is not their heavy economic burden, but rather their
lightness. Part I identifies two general reasons to doubt that there is a
significant trade-off between prosperity and regulation: first, regulatory
costs are frequently too small to matter; and second, even when the costs
are larger, reducing them would not always improve economic outcomes.
The next three parts examine evidence on the size and impact of
regulatory costs. Part II presents cost estimates for a particularly ambitious
and demanding environmental regulation, REACH—the European Union’s
new chemicals policy. Part III discusses academic research on the
“pollution haven” hypothesis, i.e. the assertion that firms move to
developing countries in search of looser environmental regulations. Part IV
reviews the literature on ex ante overestimation of regulatory costs,
including the recent claims by OMB that costs are more often
underestimated (and/or benefits overestimated) in advance.
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who meant something quite different by “unbearable lightness.”
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Turning to the economic context, Part V explains why macroeconomic
constraints may eliminate any anticipated economic gains from
deregulation. Part VI introduces a further economic argument against
welfare gains from deregulation, based on the surprising evidence that
unemployment decreases mortality. Part VII briefly concludes.
I. TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TRADE-OFF
In theory, it would be possible to spend so much on environmental
protection that basic economic needs could not be met. At a sufficiently
high level of regulatory expenditures, protecting nature and cleaning up the
air and water could absorb enough of society’s resources to compete with
the provision of more fundamental goods, such as food and shelter. From
this, it is a short leap to the conclusion that the clash between economy and
environment actually is an urgent problem, requiring detailed analysis of
regulations to prevent worsening the terms of the trade-off. But the latter
statement only follows logically if environmental policy is in fact
consuming substantial resources, which are transferable to other, more
basic needs. That is, the assumed urgency of the trade-off rests on the
implicit assumptions that the costs of environmental protection are both
large and fungible. Either of these assumptions could fail in practice; the
costs of environmental protection could be nonexistent, or too small to
matter, or the reduction of regulatory costs might not produce the desired
economic benefits.
Environmental protection with little or no costs
Costless environmental improvement is frequently assumed to be
impossible by definition. The hidden premise underlying this form of the
trade-off argument is that the market economy is already performing as
well as possible; that is, it has reached a Pareto optimum. 1 From this
perspective, any new expenditure on environmental protection necessarily
represents a loss, because it diverts resources away from the things that
consumers, in their wisdom, have chosen for themselves. 2
Reverence for market outcomes is at odds with the beliefs of many
environmental practitioners who assume that environmental improvements
1. In economic theory, a Pareto optimum is a situation in which no one can be made
better off without making someone worse off; it is a common definition of efficiency. Reza
Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325, 1329 (2006).
2. Strong forms of this argument come close to denying the existence of public goods,
or at least the possibility of efficient delivery of them. Like most discussions of
environmental regulation, this Article takes it for granted that the government can and
should deliver public goods.
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can bring economic benefits as well. The rhetoric of joint economic and
environmental progress includes such overused imagery as “win-win
solutions,” the “double [or triple] bottom line,” and opportunities to pick
the “low hanging fruit.” 3 The ubiquity of these phrases underscores the
extent to which environmental advocates find that the market is
improvable—implying that it could not have already been at an optimum.
In a more academic vein, the Porter hypothesis maintains that carefully
crafted, moderately demanding regulations can improve economic
competitiveness and success in the marketplace.4 Likewise, studies of
energy conservation and greenhouse gas reduction frequently find
opportunities for energy savings at zero or negative net cost, as in the “no
regrets” options for climate change mitigation. 5 The critique of these
opportunities is not that they are undesirable; who could argue with free
environmental improvements? Rather, economists have argued that, in their
own overused metaphors, there are no free lunches, nor twenty dollar bills
on the sidewalk. 6 If lunch is expensive and the sidewalk is bare, then the
Porter hypothesis must be impossible, and there must be hidden costs
associated with energy conservation.
Without attempting a thorough review of this debate, it seems plausible
that there are significant cases where essentially costless energy savings
and other environmental improvements are possible. In such cases, the
fears of regulatory cost burdens and concerns about trade-offs are
presumably easy to resolve; there should be a broad consensus supporting
the adoption of costless improvements.
However, literally costless improvements are not the only ones to escape
from the trade-off; economic constraints do not immediately become
relevant to real decisions as soon as regulatory costs are greater than zero.
Very small costs of regulation presumably have very small impacts on the
economy. Regulations could easily have costs that are too small to
matter—and Parts II and IV will suggest that this is the case in many
important instances. The theoretical consensus that supports costless
environmental improvement may vanish once costs become positive,

3. Andrew Hoffman et al., A Mixed-Motive Perspective on the Economics Versus
Environment Debate, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1254, 1254-76 (1999); Maureen Rogers &
Roberta Ryan, The Triple Bottom Line for Sustainable Community Development, 6 LOC.
ENV’T 279, 279-89 (2001); Chris Ryan, Moving Beyond the Low Hanging Fruit in DfE, 1 J.
INDUS. ECOLOGY 1, 3-5 (1997).
4. Michael C. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 98 (1995).
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:
MITIGATION 455 (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg3/index.htm.
6. Porter & van der Linde, supra note 4, at 90.
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however small; but practical concerns about economic impacts need not
arise until costs become large in some meaningful sense.
The question naturally arises: what counts as large? Here it is important
to resist the illusion of superficially big numbers. Quantities in the billions,
which are commonplace in federal programs and nationwide impact
assessments, 7 are essentially impossible to understand in isolation; some
standard of comparison is needed to bring them down to a comprehensible
scale. 8 Amounts in the billions of dollars are inevitably thought of as part
of a ratio: if X billion dollars is the numerator, what is the appropriate
denominator? When none is specified, the default denominator tends to be
the listener’s personal finances—in which case one or a few billion dollars
appear very large indeed.
In contrast, a penny per person, per day sounds small. But, for the
United States with its population of about three hundred million,9 a penny
per person per day and a total of one billion dollars per year are roughly the
same. 10 Per capita impacts, as in this example, are sometimes appropriate,
particularly when the costs of regulations are spread across the population
as a whole. Comparison to the revenues of the affected industry is also a
useful standard for evaluating regulatory impacts. For issues affecting the
entire United States, the European Union, or even a large industry, a few
billion dollars or euros per year is not a large number. This issue is
important in the discussion in Part II.
Environmental costs that cannot be traded for economic gains
Even when environmental policies impose noticeable economic costs, it
does not necessarily follow that these costs could be traded for greater
private incomes and consumption, or for the benefits that are thought to
accompany higher incomes. There are two strands to this unfamiliar
argument, presented in Parts V and VI below, and briefly anticipated here.
First, deregulation might not produce increased economic growth. If a
regulation or other environmental policy has measurable economic costs, it
consumes resources such as labor and capital that could have been used
elsewhere in the economy. The policy, then, can only be “traded” for
whatever those resources could have produced elsewhere—in economic
terms, the opportunity cost of those resources.
7. W. MARK CRAIN & THOMAS D. HOPKINS, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON
SMALL FIRMS 6 (2001), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs207tot.pdf.
8. A million seconds is about twelve days; a billion seconds is about thirty-two years.
9. United States Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clocks,
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
10. Id.
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During a recession, labor and capital are typically less than fully
employed. Supplying more resources that are already in surplus may not
produce anything more; the short run opportunity cost of additional
resources could be zero. On the other hand, during expansions such as the
late 1990s, the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) carefully controlled the level of
employment and rate of growth; making more resources available for
increased growth might just lead the Fed to step harder on the brakes in
order to maintain the unchanged target pace of expansion. 11 Again, the
short-run opportunity cost of additional resources could be zero.
Second, economic growth may not produce the expected or desired
benefits. An increasingly common method of analysis converts regulatory
costs into health and mortality impacts, based on correlations between
income and health. 12 In the extreme, regulatory costs that are thought to
lower market incomes have been labeled “statistical murder,” because
richer people live longer. 13
This line of argument is flawed in several respects. Perhaps the most
dramatic response to the “statistical murder” story is the epidemiological
evidence that mortality decreases in recessions. If deregulation leads to
economic growth, which boosts employment, the expected result is
paradoxically not a reduction in mortality.
In the long run, the availability of resources such as labor and capital
must have something to do with growth rates, economic opportunities, and
improvements in health and welfare. The relationship, however, is a
subtler and more tenuous one than is often recognized.
II. THE LOW COST OF REGULATING EUROPE’S CHEMICALS
Expensive regulations are less likely to be adopted in the United States
at present, due to exaggerated fears about regulatory costs, and to an
administration that is extremely sympathetic to industry’s concerns.
Examples of truly expensive regulations may be easier to find elsewhere,
such as in the European Union.14 Regulation has a better name in the
European Union than in the United States; government-imposed constraints
on private business that are taken for granted in Brussels would be

11. EBAN GOODSTEIN, THE TRADE-OFF MYTH: FACT AND FICTION ABOUT JOBS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 20-21 (1999).
12. See infra Parts V & VI.
13. Id.
14. Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (“REACH”) is an example
of a regulation that is welcome in the European Union, but would not be found in the United
States. See infra notes 16 - 19 and accompanying text.
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immediately dismissed as beyond the pale in Washington. 15
Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (“REACH”),
Europe’s new chemicals policy, is one of the most ambitious and
demanding European Union environmental regulations. When it is
adopted, likely by early 2007, REACH will require chemical manufacturers
and importers to register and test their chemicals for safety. 16 During the
eleven-year phase-in period, some thirty thousand chemicals will likely be
registered and tested.17 Depending on the outcome of the tests, some
chemicals, probably a very small minority, may be subject to partial or
complete restrictions on their use in Europe. 18 An appeals procedure
allows economic and other arguments to be raised against restrictions on
the use of a chemical. 19
As in the United States, industry groups have claimed that the costs of
regulation will be prohibitive.
A German industry federation
commissioned a study, performed by the consulting firm Arthur D. Little
(“ADL”), which presented lengthy calculations purporting to show that
REACH would devastate German manufacturing, and seriously weaken the
German economy as a whole. 20 A French industry group sponsored
another study, to date released only in the form of PowerPoint slides,
claiming that France, too, would be flattened by REACH. 21
Numerous studies done without industry funding have reached very
different conclusions, finding that the costs of REACH would be much
lower and entirely manageable. The European Commission estimated that
the costs of registration and testing would total €2.3 billion over the elevenyear period. 22 I directed a study sponsored by the Nordic Council of
Ministers, representing the governments of the Scandinavian countries,

15. Id.
16. European Chemicals Bureau, REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation
of CHemicals), http://ecb.jrc.it/REACH/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).
17. EUROPEAN COMM’N, REACH IN BRIEF 8 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at
http://ecb.jrc.it/DOCUMENTS/REACH/OVERVIEW/REACH_in_brief-2004_09_15.pdf.
18. Id. at 11-12.
19. FRANK ACKERMAN & RACHEL MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH 46-47 (2004),
available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/TrueCostsREACH.pdf.
20. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE EU SUBSTANCES POLICY 3 (Dec. 18,
2002),
available
at
http://www.adlittle.de/downloads/artikel/EU%20Chemical%20Policy_Basic%20Study_12_
2002.pdf.
21. MERCER MGMT. CONSULTING, STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE FUTURE CHEMICALS
POLICY
39-45
(Apr.
8,
2004),
available
at
http://www.uic.fr/us/pdf/Final%20Mercerstudy%20%208%204%202004.pdf.
22. EUROPEAN COMM’N, REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 17, at 14.
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which estimated the registration and testing costs at €3.5 billion.23 Our
cost estimate represents less than one euro per person per year, over the
eleven-year phase-in of REACH. 24
Perhaps a better standard of comparison is that the €3.5 billion cost, if
fully passed on to customers, would increase the average prices of the
European chemical industry by a ratio of .0006, or 1/16 of one percent.25
This is, by any reasonable standard, a very small price change. The spot
price of crude oil changes by more than that, on average, fifty-one weeks
out of the year. 26 The cost of REACH, standing alone, might sound large,
but the revenues of the European chemical industry over eleven years
amount to a much larger number of euros.27 A noticeably larger ratio could
still seem small if, as industry has sometimes claimed, most of the costs of
REACH will be borne by one third of the chemical industry; the affected
companies would be burdened with a price increase of about one fifth of
one percent. 28
The German industry study, performed by ADL, presents the most
detailed argument claiming that the costs might be much larger. Yet the
authors used only slightly higher figures than everyone else for the direct
costs of registration and testing. Their enormous estimates of the costs of
REACH came from creative calculation of indirect costs such as decreases
in productivity and delays in innovation. 29 In their economic model,
industry displays little imagination or adaptability, and never responds to
regulation by innovating or switching to safer substitutes. 30 Rather,
industry’s sole answer to regulation is to notice that profits have decreased,
and therefore to decide to cut back on production.31 A bizarre misreading
of basic microeconomic theory led ADL to estimate that production losses
would average nine times any cost increase imposed on German
industries. 32 Meanwhile, ADL mistakenly assumed that costs of REACH
23. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 19, at 32.
24. The annual cost estimate is three hundred fifteen million euro per year. Id. The
population of the European Union was four hundred fifty-six million in 2004. EUROSTAT,
EU25 POPULATION UP BY 0.4 PERCENT TO REACH 456 MILLION 1 (Aug. 31, 2004), available
at http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-31082004-BP/EN/3-31082004-BPEN.PDF.
25. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 19, at 39.
26. Id. at 41.
27. Id. at 27. The European chemical industry had sales of five hundred fifty-six billion
euro in 2003. Id.
28. 1/16 times 3 is roughly 1/5.
29. See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, supra note 20, at 29-59.
30. Id.
31. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 19, at 65-70.
32. See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, supra note 20, at 29-59.
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would be incurred over only seven years, rather than eleven, thus inflating
the annual costs during the phase-in period by more than fifty percent. 33
These and other mistakes drove cost impacts sharply upward.34
ADL identified many separate pathways by which REACH might
conceivably affect industry.
Specifically, they assumed that each
regulatory impact pathway would cause a specified percentage reduction in
industry output; all the separate reductions were assumed to be
independent, and multiplied to obtain the cumulative reduction.35 Thus, if
one regulatory impact is believed to cause a ten percent cutback in output,
and another to cause a twenty percent cut, the combination causes output to
fall to seventy-two percent of the original level. 36 This strange,
nonstandard methodology seems designed for exaggeration, as any mild
overstatement in individual factors will be amplified through multiplication
by all the other factors. If ADL has inappropriately doubled the size of one
of the individual cost factors, the entire estimate of the cost and impact of
REACH will be doubled via the multiplicative method. The appendix to
my Nordic Council study provides a detailed critique of both the individual
impact pathways and the overall methodology of the ADL study. 37
The predominant role of indirect cost impacts suggests another
comparison: How large is the ratio of indirect costs of regulation to the
direct compliance costs? The highest ratio that I am aware of in a
government, NGO, or academic study of REACH is about six to one.38
The implicit ratio in the ADL study is six hundred and fifty to one.39
Without knowing precisely what this ratio should be, it is tempting to say
that we know what it is not: in an advanced industrial economy such as
Germany, there is no visible basis for the claim that regulations impose
indirect costs of six hundred and fifty times their direct compliance costs.
United States industry and government have been emphatic in their
opposition to REACH, issuing alarmist predictions of its possible impact
on the United States.40 It seems safe to say that no recent United States

33. See id; ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 19, at 67-68.
34. See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, supra note 20, at 29-59.
35. Id. at 52-59.
36. 90% x 80% = 72%.
37. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 19, at 65-70.
38. Id. at 43.
39. Id. at 43-44.
40. Kris Christen, EU Stands Firm on Chemical Regulation Overhaul, ENVTL. SCI. &
TECH.
ONLINE,
Dec.
4,
2003,
http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/esthagw/2003/dec/policy/kc_overhaul.html. These, too, are greatly exaggerated; at worst, United
States companies exporting to Europe might face the same percentage cost increase as
European companies. A small percentage is a small percentage, whether it is expressed in

ACKERMAN_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:22 PM

UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS

109

regulations has approached the ambition or scope of REACH. If one of
Europe’s most demanding regulations will increase prices by one sixteenth
of one percent, imagine how much less the costs will be for the timid
proposals that still pass muster in Washington.
III. POLLUTION HAVENS: THEORY VS. REALITY 41
If regulatory costs imposed significant burdens on the economy, it
should be easy to find their footprints. Because the costs are not uniformly
distributed, there should be dramatic extremes where regulations have trod
most heavily on the human landscape. Companies that have closed
because of environmental costs, moving to Mexico or other countries
where the regulatory climate was more lenient; workers thrown out of jobs
by rigid environmental strictures; formerly prosperous communities shut
down by the economic burdens of command-and-control regulation—these
dramatic extremes should be all around us. If the fabled regulations of
mass destruction exist, there is no way to hide them in a bunker; they
should be visible for all to see. But the actual, identifiable examples of
jobs lost to regulations rarely extend beyond a handful of stories about
small numbers of workers in the most directly environmentally damaging,
rural industries such as logging and coal mining. 42
The economic impacts of environmental regulations have been
extensively studied for years. As Eban Goodstein has demonstrated, there
is no evidence that significant numbers of jobs or businesses have ever
been lost for environmental reasons. 43 Companies don’t move, between
states or between countries, to avoid expensive environmental standards,
because environmental standards aren’t that expensive. 44 Environmental
compliance costs are more than two percent of industry revenues only in a
handful of the most polluting industries; Goodstein cites a maximum of
seven percent for pulp mills. 45 Among the reasons for major layoffs, as
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, environmental and safetyrelated shutdowns are among the least common, accounting for about a
tenth of a percent of job losses. 46 Contrary to predictions, the Clean Air
euros or in dollars.
41. This section draws heavily on the work of Eban Goodstein and Kevin Gallagher.
See generally KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: MEXICO, NAFTA
AND BEYOND (2004); GOODSTEIN, supra note 11.
42. GOODSTEIN, supra note 11, at 66-67.
43. Id. at 41-67.
44. Id. at 171.
45. Id. at 48.
46. Id. at 47; Frank Ackerman & Rachel Massey, Prospering with Precaution:
Employment, Economics, and the Precautionary Principle 3 (Aug. 2002), available at
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Act Amendments of 1990 did not destroy jobs; 47 the same is true for the
stringent local air quality regulations imposed by the South Coast Air
Quality Management District in Southern California. 48 A study of the
South Coast regulations concluded, “[i]n contrast to the widespread belief
that environmental regulation costs jobs, the most severe episode of airquality regulation of industry in the [United States] probably created a few
jobs.” 49
Economists have carried out extensive studies of the “pollution haven
hypothesis,” i.e., the notion that polluting industries will flee to countries
with lax environmental standards. The results have been almost entirely
negative. A 1995 review of the literature on the subject concluded:
Overall, there is relatively little evidence to support the hypothesis that
environmental regulations have had a large adverse effect on
competitiveness, however that elusive term is defined. . . . Studies
attempting to measure the effect of environmental regulation on net
exports, overall trade flows, and plant-location decisions have produced
estimates that are either small, statistically insignificant, or not robust to
tests of model specification. 50

A more recent literature review reached similar conclusions. 51 Eric
Neumayer demonstrates that neither the United States nor Germany has
had unusually large net outflows of investment in dirty industries; a section
of his chapter on the subject is subtitled, “Why is there so little evidence for
pollution havens?” 52 Brian Copeland and Scott Taylor, in a very thorough
theoretical and empirical analysis of trade and the environment, conclude
that “the evidence does not support the notion that trade patterns are driven
by pollution haven motives.” 53 Kevin Gallagher shows that the dirtiest
industries in the United States have not been migrating to Mexico, either
before or after North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); these
industries represent a declining share of industry in the United States—but

http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/PrecautionAHTAug02.pdf.
47. See GOODSTEIN, supra note 11, at 41-67.
48. Id. at 54.
49. Id.
50. Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132, 157-58
(1995).
51. Ravishankar J. Jayadevappa & Sumedha Chhatre, International Trade and
Environmental Quality: A Survey, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 175, 194 (2000).
52. ERIC NEUMAYER, GREENING TRADE AND INVESTMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
WITHOUT PROTECTIONISM 55 (2001).
53. BRIAN R. COPELAND & M. SCOTT TAYLOR, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE 277 (2003).
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an even more rapidly declining share of manufacturing in Mexico.54 Hence
their decline in the United States has not been caused by relocation south of
the border. Moreover, a handful of major industries—steel, aluminum, and
cement—appear to be cleaner (i.e., emit smaller amounts of criteria air
pollutants per dollar of sales) in Mexico than in the United States.55 A
likely explanation for this unexpected pattern is that the Mexican plants are
newer than their United States counterparts, and incorporate newer, cleaner
technology. 56
The economics literature is nearly, but not quite, unanimous on this
question. Two recent articles have found modest empirical support for the
pollution haven hypothesis. Matthew Kahn and Yutaka Yoshino use
intricate and indirect methods of measuring the pollution intensity of trade
inside and outside of regional trading blocs.57 They find that for trade
outside of blocs, middle-income countries tend to expand dirty exports as
they grow, while high-income countries expand cleaner exports. 58 The
effect is weaker inside regional trading blocs.59
Matthew Cole presents superficially contradictory findings on trade
between the United States and Mexico. 60 On the one hand, the trade flows
in both directions are becoming cleaner, but Mexico’s exports to the United
States are becoming cleaner (declining in air pollution intensity) faster than
United States exports to Mexico. 61 Since 1988, he finds “[t]he pollution
embodied in United States imports from Mexico [has been] less than that
embodied in exports to Mexico and, furthermore, this gap has been
widening rather than narrowing.” 62 On balance, it is Mexico rather than
the United States that is escaping from trade-related air pollution on the
other side of the Río Grande, which seemingly contradicts the pollution
haven hypothesis. 63 On the other hand, Cole finds that United States
imports, from Mexico and from the world, are growing faster, as a share of
United States consumption, in industries that have higher pollution
54. GALLAGHER, supra note 41, at 7-9.
55. Id. at 51-57.
56. Id. at 61.
57. See generally Matthew E. Kahn & Yutaka Yoshino, Testing for Pollution Havens
Inside and Outside of Regional Trading Blocs, ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 2324 (2004).
58. Id. at 23.
59. Id. at 24.
60. Matthew Cole, U.S. Environmental Load Displacement: Examining Consumption,
Regulations and the Role of NAFTA, 28 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 439, 439 (2004). A careful
reading shows that his results are not literally in conflict with each other. Id.
61. Id. at 443.
62. Id. at 441.
63. Id. at 449.
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abatement costs, just as the pollution haven hypothesis would suggest. 64
Neither of these articles finds a strong effect, and neither presents a
clear, easily interpreted picture of the movement of industry in response to
United States pollution control costs. Meanwhile, the bulk of the
economics literature, as described earlier, continues to suggest that a good
pollution haven is hard to find. 65
IV. ADVANCE OVERESTIMATES OF REGULATORY COSTS
By now there is substantial literature demonstrating that the best-known
claims of extraordinary costs imposed by environmental policy do not
stand up to careful examination. Tales of billions of dollars spent per life
saved by esoteric regulations are based on errors and misrepresentation;
they represent, as Lisa Heinzerling put it, “regulatory costs of mythic
proportions.” 66 No attempt will be made to summarize the full extent of
that literature here.
However, one aspect of the issue is worth expanding upon, namely the
biases in prospective estimates of regulatory costs. Prospective estimates
are, of course, all that is available when a new policy is under discussion.
The evidence is clear: the costs of environmental protection are much more
often overestimated, rather than underestimated, in advance.67
A classic example is the 1974 Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) standard for workplace exposure to vinyl chloride.
Consultants to OSHA estimated the costs of reducing vinyl chloride
exposure at around one billion dollars; industry estimates were even
higher. 68 Actual costs turned out to be around a quarter of OSHA’s
estimate, since industry quickly developed new, cost-effective technologies
to comply with the regulation. 69
Similar patterns have been found for many environmental standards.
One study found that compliance costs for environmental regulations were

64. Id.
65. See infra Part III.
66. Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981,
1981 (1998); Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory
Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648, 648 (2002).
67. See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
68. Thomas C. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2031 (2002).
69. U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, GAUGING CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH—AN APPRAISAL OF
OSHA’S
ANALYTIC
APPROACH
73
(1995),
available
at
http://www.dau.mil/educdept/mm_dept_resources/reports/OTA-Gauging-control-tech-andimpact-on-OSHA.pdf.
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overestimated in advance in eleven out of twelve cases. 70 Another study
found that advance cost estimates for environmental compliance turned out
to be more than twenty-five percent too high in fourteen out of twentyeight cases, while they were more than twenty-five percent too low in only
three of the twenty-eight cases. 71 A study for Environment Canada and the
Ontario Ministry of Energy, Science and Technology, focusing specifically
on the costs of controlling chlorinated substances, confirmed that
overestimation of regulatory costs is more common than underestimation.72
An in-depth examination of prospective cost estimates for regulations by
Thomas McGarity and Ruth Ruttenberg reviews most of these as well as
quite a few other examples, and identifies a series of reasons why cost
estimates are biased upward in advance.73 First, regulators rely on
regulated industries for empirical data, and the industries have a clear
interest in secrecy and/or inflated cost estimates, either of which will
discourage strict regulation. 74 In addition, the likelihood of court
challenges to strict regulations pushes agencies toward making
conservative assumptions, again tilting in favor of the regulated
industries. 75 Also, for lack of information, agency analyses often compare
the costs of a proposed regulation to a zero regulation baseline, rather than
the appropriate measurement of the incremental costs relative to existing
regulations. 76 Companies’ reported costs of regulatory compliance
sometimes include costs of upgrading other equipment at the same time
that environmental controls are installed.77 Finally, regulatory analyses
frequently take a static approach, ignoring the learning curve effects,
economies of scale, and regulation-induced productivity increases that may
result from new environmental standards. 78
On the other hand, McGarity and Ruttenberg note that there are also
downward biases in cost estimates, including a tendency to ignore indirect

70. HART HODGES, FALLING PRICES: COST OF COMPLYING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS ALMOST ALWAYS LESS THAN ADVERTISED 4 (1997), available at
http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/bp69.pdf.
71. Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 314 (2000).
72. CHEMINFO SERVS., A RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION OF CONTROL MEASURES FOR
CHLORINATED SUBSTANCES (CASE STUDIES OF EX-ANTE/EX-POST SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS)
(Mar. 2000), available at http://www.on.ec.gc.ca/community/chlorine%2Dreport/.
73. McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 68, at 2042.
74. Id. at 2044-46.
75. Id. at 2046.
76. Id. at 2047.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2048-49.
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social costs of regulation,79 reliance on vendors of control technologies
who are eager to win new markets, 80 and a failure to take sufficient account
of “Murphy’s Law” in projecting responses to regulatory requirements.81
On balance, the factors producing upward bias appear more numerous and
more powerful. 82
The OMB Response: 2004
The opposite perspective continues to be argued in the annual reports
from OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. 83 The 2004
Report devoted three pages 84 to the discussion of ex ante versus ex post
regulatory cost estimates, leading with the assertion that many
commentators believe costs are underestimated in advance. OMB cites
three studies in support of the view that regulatory costs are typically
underestimated.85 Yet all three simply claim that costs are large, not that
advance estimates are consistently low. The details of these claims are not
impressive. First, Mark Crain and Thomas Hopkins, in a consultant report
for the Small Business Administration, agonize at length over the plausible
idea that there are economies of scale in regulatory compliance, so that
smaller firms have a higher compliance cost per employee. 86 For its
estimates of environmental regulatory costs, the study uses the high end of
the range published by OMB. 87 So in citing this study, OMB is effectively
citing itself, not a new source of information.
Second, Harvey James estimates the costs of compliance for twenty-five

79. McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 68, at 2050.
80. Id. at 2045-46.
81. Id. at 2050.
82. Id. at 2050-51.
OF
MGMT.
&
BUDGET,
PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM:
83. OFFICE
2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 51-53 (2004),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2004_cb_final.pdf [hereinafter OMB,
PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING
REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES
48
(2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf
[hereinafter
OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS].
84. OMB, PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 83, at 51-53.
85. Id.
86. MARK W. CRAIN & THOMAS D. HOPKINS, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON
SMALL
FIRMS
3-5,
20-22
(2000),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs207tot.pdf.
87. Id. at 8-9.
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OSHA regulations as of 1993. 88 But he also observes that the cost per firm
was five and a half times higher in a 1974 study of OSHA compliance costs
done by the National Association of Manufacturers. 89 James then simply
asserts that the costs per firm could not be lower today than in 1974. 90 On
that basis, he multiplies his 1993 numbers by five and a half—thereby
eliminating all empirical content in his study of 1993 costs, and simply
recycling a 1974 estimate by an anti-regulatory industry group. 91
Finally, a detailed economic modeling exercise by Dale Jorgenson and
Peter Wilcoxen estimates the impact of environmental regulations on
United States economic growth. 92 They state at the outset that they have
not attempted to assess any of the benefits, to consumers or to producers, of
a cleaner environment. 93 As a result, “the conclusions of this study cannot
be taken to imply that pollution control is too burdensome or, for that
matter, insufficiently restrictive.”94
Modeling costs, but not benefits, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen found that the
economic growth rate was reduced by 0.19 percent due to regulations
during 1974-1983. 95 They analyzed a scenario involving the complete
absence of regulations, including the removal of all limitations on the use
of high sulfur coal, and all motor vehicle pollution controls.96 Even if one
were willing to contemplate such a wholehearted embrace of smog, acid
rain, and toxicity, there are two reasons why the effect on the growth rate
would be smaller today. First, the study was based on a period when the
first round of spending for compliance with the Clean Air Act and the
Clean Water Act was underway. 97 Second, it was also a period when the
dirty industries which account for most pollution control spending
represented a larger fraction of the United States economy than at

88. HARVEY S. JAMES, JR., ESTIMATING OSHA COMPLIANCE COSTS 325-26 (1998),
available at http://www.ssu.missouri.edu/Faculty/HJames/Articles/james_PS1998b.pdf.
89. Id. at 322-24.
90. Id.
91. Id. The polemical nature of this study is suggested by its prominent table of the
costs of compliance with OSHA regulations proposed in the late 1970s. Id. Almost all of
the costs in the table are for compliance with a generic carcinogen standard—presumably
the standard that was rejected in the Benzene decision. Id. Only in a note many pages later,
at the end of the article, does James acknowledge that the generic carcinogen standard was
never actually implemented. Id. at 339 n.8.
92. Dale W. Jorgenson & Peter J. Wilcoxen, Environmental Regulations and U.S.
Economic Growth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 314, 325-37 (1990).
93. Id. at 314-15.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 338.
96. Id. at 325-32.
97. Id.
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The OMB Response: 2005
In its 2005 report, OMB takes a different tack. In a chapter entitled
“Validation of benefit cost estimates made prior to regulation,” the report
reviews “forty-seven federal rules where pre-regulation estimates of
benefits and costs were made by federal agencies and some post-regulation
information is published by academics or government agencies.” 99 The
bottom line judgment is that overestimates of benefit-cost ratios were more
common than underestimates: eleven advance estimates were declared
accurate (meaning that advance estimates were within twenty-five percent
of the retrospective judgments), twenty-two were too high, and fourteen
were too low. 100
OMB’s report is not strictly comparable to other literature on advance
cost estimates. It differs from other analyses in restricting its attention to
estimates made by federal agencies; many of the most controversial and
politically significant estimates are made or sponsored by industry groups.
Thus, it could still be the case that regulatory cost estimates that arise in
political debates are typically overestimated, whether or not federal
agencies have a tendency to underestimate.
Moreover, OMB examines both costs and benefits, and finds advance
estimates to be too high much more often for benefits than for costs.101
Evaluating OMB’s judgments on benefits estimates would be a substantial
task, which is, for the most part, not undertaken here. Regulations do not
operate in a vacuum; even in hindsight, it is not immediately obvious how
large the benefits from a regulation have turned out to be. If a regulation
reduces the risk of death in an industry or community, it is necessary to
distinguish the effects of the regulation itself from any other factors that
may have altered death rates in the same period. In other words, a
retrospective study would be needed to identify those benefits—and
methodological errors could bias the retrospective, as well as the
prospective, estimates.
Despite these differences in approach, OMB’s discussion of the fortyseven rules appears to be a response to the findings of advance
overestimates of costs. Even on its own terms, accepting OMB’s
judgments on the individual rules, the report is fundamentally unpersuasive

98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 83, at 42.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 44-46.
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for two reasons. First, the report does not establish a reasonable basis for
inferring that federal agencies tend to overestimate; its data does not
contain a statistically significant bias toward overestimates. Second, the
report’s main finding is entirely due to its treatment of OSHA estimates,102
which raise a number of unique issues unrelated to general biases in
estimates.103
The choice of rules was based solely on data availability, heavily skewed
by a few sources that reviewed multiple rules.104 OMB refers to the rules
as a “convenience sample” which does not necessarily represent federal
rules in general. 105 But let us suppose for the moment that they were a true
random sample of federal rules and agency estimates, and see what the
sample would imply about the overall tendency to overestimate.
With eleven advance estimates accurate, twenty-two over, and fourteen
under, OMB’s sample is not terribly far from finding the average estimate
to be accurate. Change just four of the overestimates to under, and all trace
of bias would disappear. How likely is it that the appearance of bias has
occurred purely by chance? For the purpose of statistical analysis, OMB’s
judgments can be converted to numbers: zero for accurate, negative one for
underestimates, and plus one for overestimates. Now, the sample mean is
0.17, and the standard error is 0.13. The null hypothesis that the true mean
is zero, i.e. no bias, cannot be rejected, with p = .19. In other words, if
there was no bias in reality and we drew a random sample of forty-seven
cases, there is a nineteen percent probability that it would look at least as
biased as the OMB sample. Of course, standard statistical practice, which
OMB would certainly insist on in agency scientific analyses, requires p =
.05 or less to reject the null hypothesis of no effect.
In contrast, the Harrington et al. study mentioned earlier,106 which found
three underestimates of costs, fourteen overestimates, and eleven accurate,
passes the significance test with flying colors: using the same numerical
scoring, the sample mean is .38, with a standard error of .13. The null
hypothesis that the true mean is zero is clearly rejected, with p = .005; there
is less than a one percent probability of getting the Harrington et al. result
by chance if there is no real bias in advance cost estimates.107

102. See infra notes 104-115 and accompanying text.
103. Id.
104. OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 83, at 44-46.
105. Id. at 48.
106. Harrington et al., supra note 71, at 314.
107. Harrington et al. find a tendency to overestimate regulatory costs, while OMB
alleges a tendency to overestimate benefit-cost ratios. Thus “overestimate” has opposite
implications in the two contexts.
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Not only does the slight appearance of bias in the OMB study turn out to
be statistically insignificant, it is also entirely due to OMB’s treatment of
the thirteen OSHA rules. As shown in Table 1, all of the tilt toward
overestimates comes from the OSHA rules, where OMB believes that
overestimates of benefit-cost ratios are essentially the norm. 108 Among the
non-OSHA rules in OMB’s sample, underestimates slightly outnumber
overestimates, although with p > .5 (see table) it is completely clear that
this pattern is not statistically significant.
Table 1. OMB analysis of advance benefit-cost estimates
Total

OSHA

All other

Accurate
Overestimate
Underestimate

11
22
14

2
11
0

9
11
14

p value for no bias

.19

.00

.56

There is essentially no chance that the true mean, or bias, is the same for
the OSHA and non-OSHA rules; statistically, the hypothesis that the two
groups have equal means is rejected with p < .00001.
In the end, the scant evidence of overestimates provided by OMB comes
down to their treatment of the thirteen OSHA rules. In six of the thirteen
cases, OMB relied on a single source, an article by Si Kyung Seong and
John Mendeloff. 109 That article discusses OSHA’s tendency toward
prospective overestimates of benefits, suggesting several explanations.110
Prospective estimates from regulatory agencies typically assume complete
implementation of proposed rules, whereas retrospective evaluations reflect
actual, potentially incomplete implementation.111 The availability of data
on workplace fatalities improved significantly in 1992, allowing more
accurate estimates of reduced mortality due to regulations; nine of the
108. OSHA’s 1974 vinyl chloride rule, discussed above, is a famous case in which
advance estimates of costs were far too high. The rule did not make it into OMB’s
“convenience sample.” See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
109. Si Kyung Seong & John Mendeloff, Assessing the Accuracy of OSHA’s Projections
of the Benefits of New Safety Standards, 45 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 313, 313-28 (2004).
110. Id. at 324-28.
111. Id. at 324.
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thirteen OSHA rules in the OMB study were adopted before 1992.112
Seong and Mendeloff also suggest that OSHA is more likely to be
inaccurate in analyzing less expensive rules, which naturally receive less
analytical effort; and they conclude that OSHA systematically
overestimates the benefits of training programs. 113
Thus, the allegation that OSHA overestimates benefits could simply
reflect the agency’s beleaguered status.
Ever since the Reagan
administration, OSHA has been particularly hard-hit by industry and
conservative attacks, budget cuts, and defeats in the courts. 114 As a result,
OSHA may be more constrained and powerless than other regulatory
agencies. It is all too believable that OSHA is constantly planning on
complete implementation of its rules but unable to achieve it, or that it has
been forced to stick to small proposals, frequently involving nothing more
than training programs. According to Seong and Mendeloff, the result
would be a pattern of overestimation of benefits of OSHA regulations.115
This is an important story, but it bears no resemblance to OMB’s
suggestion of a pattern of systematic overestimation of benefit-cost ratios
by government agencies.
V. OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND GROWTH-GROWTH TRADE-OFFS
The previous sections have suggested several reasons to doubt that
environmental regulations impose huge economic costs. This section turns
to the economic context of the debate, arguing that even if regulatory costs
look significant, deregulation might produce surprisingly little additional
growth and personal consumption.
The costs of regulation do not consist of goods that would be of direct
use to consumers; if regulation was rolled back, it would not be helpful to
simply redistribute scrubbers, filters, catalytic converters, and the like to
other users. Rather, the trade-off hypothesis must be that regulation
requires the use of productive resources, principally labor and capital; in
the absence of regulation, these resources could be used to produce
consumer goods or other desirable products. A related assumption,
normally taken for granted, is that expanding the available supplies of labor
and capital would in fact increase the production of consumer goods. 116
112. Id. at 315.
113. Id. at 325-26.
114. See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE
FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFTEY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (1993).
115. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
116. The same discussion applies not just to consumer goods, but to any desirable goods
that could be produced with the resources used for regulatory compliance. Likewise, it
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Yet the truth of that related assumption is less obvious than it might
seem. Suppose that deregulation occurs during a recession. In that case,
unemployed labor and capital are already available on the market; indeed,
that is almost the definition of a recession. It is far from certain that
increasing the surplus of idle labor and capital will produce any economic
benefit in the short run.
Alternatively, suppose the deregulation occurs during an economic
expansion. It is becoming increasingly standard practice for the Federal
Reserve (“the Fed”) to maintain tight control of the pace of expansion,
effectively preventing an acceleration of growth above a target level. 117 In
the late 1990s, for instance, economic growth was limited by Federal
Reserve intervention—not by regulations, or by the availability of labor or
capital. 118 Again, an increase in available productive resources might not
have led to any additional output, income, or consumption in the short run.
If deregulation had put more labor and capital on the market, the Fed might
have simply clamped down harder to achieve its targets. 119
In the long run, the availability of labor and capital must have something
to do with the pace of economic growth. The manner in which that long
run effect occurs, however, depends on macroeconomic mechanisms about
which there is no consensus. Would additional labor and capital somehow
accelerate the recovery from recession, or make the next recession less
deep? In an expansion, would the Fed quickly notice that increased output
is now possible without risking inflation, or would it take years—perhaps
even another business cycle—for the Fed’s targets to adjust to the
additional resources? Both theoretical and empirical macroeconomic
analyses would be required to have confidence in the answers to these
questions.
A common critique of risk-reducing regulation today is that it should
examine “risk-risk” trade-offs, considering not only the risk directly
addressed by regulation, but also the offsetting risks that might be
indirectly created by the regulation.120 It is equally the case that
calculations involving the costs of regulation should examine the “growthgrowth” trade-offs, considering not only the resources used in regulatory
compliance, but also the actual benefits available from using those
applies to the resources saved by avoiding new regulation, as well as the resources released
by deregulation. For narrative simplicity, this section tells the story purely in terms of
deregulation and consumer goods.
117. GOODSTEIN, supra note 11, at 20-21.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See generally RISK V. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1996).
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resources elsewhere. In the short run, there may be no foregone growth at
all. If the claim is that deregulation would create additional growth only in
the long run, via slow, complex pathways, then the usual arguments about
the need to discount future benefits would apply to this economic gain.
Not only the extent of growth, but the timing, needs to be calculated in
order to determine the real opportunity cost of the resources used to comply
with regulations.
VI. IS EMPLOYMENT HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH?
A clever rhetorical strategy has appeared in recent economic arguments
for deregulation. Rather than emphasizing the monetary costs of regulation
per se, critics of regulation have converted these costs into numbers of
deaths that supposedly result from the expenditures. 121 Expensive
regulations can thus be charged with “statistical murder.” As Lisa
Heinzerling and I have argued, 122 the “statistical murder” theory is doubly
fallacious. The correlation between income and mortality is weak in
developed countries, except at very low income levels; different variants of
the statistical murder story have used widely differing prices per life saved,
resting on different indirect inferences from very limited data.123
Moreover, regulation does not remove money from the economy, so much
as cause it to be spent in different sectors.124 Incomes decrease for those
who produce and sell polluting products, but increase for those who
develop, install, and operate pollution controls, monitor compliance, and
research and debate regulatory options.125 Whether or not one considers
this reallocation to be desirable, it is primarily a change in the composition,
not the aggregate level, of national income. 126
An even more decisive rebuttal is available. Remarkably enough, the
statistical evidence shows that mortality decreases during recessions, and
increases as employment rises.127 So even if the costs of regulation were
large enough to matter, despite the evidence to the contrary in Parts II and
IV, and even if deregulation boosted economic growth and employment in
the short run, despite the arguments to the contrary in Part V, the result

121. See John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection against
Risk at Less Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 28 (1997).
122. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 56-59 (2004).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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might well be an increased death rate.
The evidence on mortality and business cycles is presented in a
symposium in the December 2005 issue of the International Journal of
Epidemiology. The lead article, by José A. Tapia Granados, presents and
analyzes data for the United States throughout the twentieth century.128
Age-adjusted mortality rates are significantly, negatively correlated with
unemployment rates—meaning that death rates go up when unemployment
goes down—for the population as a whole, and separately for men and
women, and for whites and nonwhites. 129 The relationship is strongest for
the working age population. 130
Looking at individual causes of death, in the late twentieth century (after
1970) deaths from traffic accidents, major cardiovascular diseases, and
cirrhosis of the liver were all significantly, negatively related to the rate of
unemployment. 131 In earlier periods, there was also a strong relationship
between employment and flu and pneumonia deaths, and a weaker but
significant relationship with cancer deaths, in the same “perverse”
direction. 132 Of the major causes of death examined in the article, only
suicide shows the naïvely “expected” pattern of worsening when
unemployment rises. 133
Another study, by Christopher Ruhm, similarly found that for 19721991, increased unemployment was associated with decreases in total
mortality in eight of ten major causes of death. 134 The two exceptions were
Ruhm’s findings of no significant relationship between unemployment and
cancer deaths, and, as in the study discussed above, more suicides at times
of higher unemployment. 135
When more people are working, there is more traffic and therefore more
traffic fatalities.136 There is also more stress at work and hence more
cardiovascular disease. 137 During economic upturns, alcohol and tobacco
consumption increases, as does obesity; meanwhile, time spent on exercise,

128. José A. Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality During the Expansions of the United
States Economy 1900–1996, 34 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1194, 1194-1202 (2005) [hereinafter
Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality.
129. Id. at 1196-98.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1198.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Christopher J. Ruhm, Are Recessions Good for Your Health?, 115 Q. J. ECON. 617,
617 (2000).
135. Id. at 618, 624-25.
136. Id. at 621.
137. Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality, supra note 128, at 1200-01.
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sleep, and social interactions all decrease. 138 In the past, workplace
contagion may have caused deaths by spreading infectious diseases such as
flu and pneumonia. 139 Even though some underlying causes of mortality,
such as stress, involve chronic, long-term conditions, the timing of deaths
may reflect short-term triggers related to employment. Heart attacks
among the working age population are known to peak on Mondays. 140
Although counterintuitive, the finding of an association between
increased employment and increased mortality is not new. Peer-reviewed
publications making this point date back to 1922, and have continued
throughout the intervening years.141 Most have been in public health
journals, although at least one has appeared in a leading economics
journal. 142 American, Canadian, and British data all support the idea that
recessions are somehow better for health.143 One epidemiologist, Harvey
Brenner, has long challenged this finding, 144 but Tapia and Ruhm both
provide effective critiques of Brenner’s statistical methodology. 145 Tapia
maintains that Brenner has used excessively complicated models with too
little data to validate them, undermining the credibility of his time series
results. 146 Ruhm suggests that Brenner’s earlier study of a forty-year span
from the 1930s to the 1970s primarily reflects the decline in mortality that
occurred as the United States emerged from the 1930s depression. 147 This
era witnessed important medical and nutritional advances, as well as rising
incomes and declining unemployment. 148
Two other major objections should be noted. First, at an individual
level, death rates are higher for the unemployed than for the employed.149
This is not incompatible with the aggregate pattern. Perhaps mortality is
138. Ruhm, supra note 134, at 636-44; Tapia Granados, supra note 128, at 1201.
139. Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality, supra note 128, at 1198, 1200. The
correlation of flu and pneumonia mortality with unemployment was significant before 1970,
but not after. Id.
140. Stefan N. Willich et al., Weekly Variation of Acute Myocardial Infarction: Increased
Monday Risk in the Working Population, 90 CIRCULATION 87, 87-93 (1994).
141. Ruhm, supra note 134, at 618.
142. Id. at 617.
143. Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality, supra note 128, at 1194, 1196-98.
144. Harvey M. Brenner, Commentary: Economic Growth is the Basis of Mortality Rate
Decline in the 20th Century—Experience of the United States 1901–2000, 34 INT’L J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1214, 1215 (2005).
145. José A. Tapia Granados, Response: On Economic Growth, Business Fluctuations,
and Health Progress, 34 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1226, 1226-28 (2005) [hereinafter Tapia
Granados, Response]; Ruhm, supra note 134, at 618.
146. Tapia Granados, Response, supra note 145, at 1226-28.
147. Ruhm, supra note 134, at 618.
148. Id. at 618 n.3.
149. Id. at 627.
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always higher for the unemployed than for the employed, but it is higher
for each group during economic expansions than during recessions; it is
easy to construct numerical examples in which overall mortality increases
during expansions.
Second, over the long run it is clear that rising incomes have been
associated with falling death rates. 150 However, the correlation is not
perfect; the periods of fastest declines in death rates are not the times of
fastest increase in incomes. 151 The long-run decreases in mortality may be
caused by changes that are only loosely correlated with income, such as
improvements in sanitation, public health, and achievement of minimum
nutritional standards. 152 Over the long run, the decrease in mortality rates
is one of the most important effects of economic development; but this
need not imply any relationship to short-term economic fluctuations in an
already developed country. Small gains in average income, hypothesized
to occur as a result of deregulation, could be associated with no
improvement, or even worsening, in public health and nutritional standards
for the poor. Needless to say, there is not much left of the anti-regulatory
“statistical murder” story once this perspective on unemployment and
mortality is acknowledged.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has presented several pieces of the picture of regulatory
costs; by way of conclusion, it may be helpful to briefly summarize the
argument as a whole. Reports of the economic burden imposed by
regulatory costs have been greatly exaggerated. The widely imagined
trade-off between economic prosperity and environmental protection rests
on multiply mistaken premises. Many environmental policies impose little
or no net costs on the economy; even when regulatory costs appear
significant, there may be no short run opportunity to exchange those costs
for additional economic growth; and even when growth occurs, it may not
lead to desired outcomes such as reduced mortality.
Even a policy as ambitious as REACH will lead to very small cost
increases, raising the price of chemicals sold in Europe by an estimated
one-sixteenth of a percent. Claims of ominously greater impacts appear
primarily in industry-funded studies, the most detailed of which relies on
an idiosyncratic and indefensible methodology. Likewise, there is little
evidence of jobs actually lost to regulations, outside of a few of the most
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environmentally damaging, extractive industries. The “pollution haven
hypothesis,” suggesting that companies move to regions or countries with
more lenient environmental regulations, has been rejected by virtually all
analysts who have studied the topic.
Several researchers have found that prospective estimates of the costs of
regulation are more likely to be too high than too low. One of the principal
voices rejecting this finding is that of OMB, which has maintained in its
annual reports that regulatory costs may be underestimated, or benefit-cost
ratios overestimated, in advance. The grounds for this contrary conclusion
include citation of a limited number of unconvincing studies, and
manipulation of a regulatory data set which does not show a statistically
significant tendency toward overestimates of benefit-cost ratios.
Even when regulations have significant costs, it is not necessarily the
case that these costs are fungible. In a recession, idle economic resources
are already available and are not creating short-run growth; in an
expansion, the Federal Reserve may enforce predetermined limits on the
pace of growth in order to prevent inflation. It is now common to discuss
the need for a “risk-risk analysis,” comparing old risks alleviated by
policies to the new risks created by the same process. It is equally
necessary to consider a “growth-growth analysis,” comparing economic
costs imposed by policies to the actual opportunity cost of the same
resources used elsewhere.
Finally, even if growth were to occur as a result of deregulation, it is not
certain that it would lead to the anticipated beneficial consequences, such
as reduced mortality. A remarkable line of empirical research demonstrates
that in the United States and several other countries in the twentieth
century, age-adjusted mortality rates increased during economic expansions
and declined during recessions. The rhetorical equation of regulations with
reduced growth and increased mortality, dubbed “statistical murder” by
regulatory critics, turns out to be dead wrong.

